

Jake Wojtowicz

Curriculum Vitae

Area of Specialization	Ethics, Philosophy of Sport
Areas of Competence	Applied Ethics, History of Ethics, Philosophy of Law, Social and Political Philosophy

Education

- 2019 PhD, King's College London
Agent-Regret in Our Lives (for abstract, see final page)
Supervised by David Owens and Massimo Renzo
Examined by Antony Duff and Ulrike Heuer
- 2016 Visiting PhD student, Cornell University
- 2015 Master of Philosophical Studies, King's College London
Why Knowledge is Not Merely True Belief
Supervised by David Galloway
- 2013 BA Philosophy, King's College London

Publications

Book

- Why It's Okay To Be A Sports Fan, co-authored with Alfred Archer, *Routledge* (Under Contract)

Journal articles & book chapters

- 2021 The Purity of Agent-Regret, *Philosophy*, forthcoming
- 2021 "COVID-19 and the Integrity of Football," *Philosophy, Sport and the Pandemic*, Jeffrey Fry and Andrew Edgar (eds.), forthcoming with Routledge
- 2021 with Alex Wolf-Root. "Champions in the Age of COVID-19," *Sport, Ethics & Philosophy* 15 (1): 3-13
- 2021 "Fans, Identity, and Punishment," *Sport, Ethics & Philosophy* 15 (1): 59-73
- 2019 "Agent-Regret and Sporting Glory," *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport* 46 (2): 162-76
- 2018 "Bernard Williams on Regarding One's Own Action Purely Externally," *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* 4 (1): 49-66

Reviews & shorter pieces

- 2021 "Breivik (ed.) – Skills, Knowledge, and Expertise in Sports," *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*
- 2021 "Gideon Yaffe, The Age of Culpability: Children and the Nature of Criminal Responsibility," *The Journal of Moral Philosophy*
- 2020 "Erin C Tarver – The I in Team: Sports Fandom and the Reproduction of Identity," *The Journal of the Philosophy of Sport* 47 (3): 477-487
- 2020 "Todd May – A Decent Life: Morality for the Rest of Us," *Philosophy*, 95 (2): 233-236
- 2016 "Bernard Williams – Essays and Reviews 1959-2002," *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 19 (4): 1073-1074
- 2015 "Disagreeing and Getting to the Truth: A Reply to Sartwell," *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 4 (9): 46-50.

Public philosophy

- 2021 "Should We Boycott the 2022 World Cup?" *Public Ethics*
- 2021 "How empty stadiums are killing the character of sports clubs" *New Statesman*
- 2021 with Ben Davies "Daunte Wright: Policing and Accountability" *Practical Ethics: Ethics in the News*
- 2020 "Essay: Asphyxiation death of Daniel Prude a moral failure of Rochester Police Department" *Democrat & Chronicle*
- 2020 "If all our actions are shaped by luck, are we still agents?" *Aeon*
- 2020 "The Witcher and the Lesser of Two Evils," *Prindle Post*
- 2019 "Judging Judy: Truth and Redemption on Netflix," *Phi Magazine*
- 2018 "What Football Can Teach Us About the Philosophy of Regret," *Prospect Magazine*

Essay Prize

- 2019 *The Institute of Philosophy's Jacobsen Essay Prize* for "The Narcissism of Agent-Regret"

Talks and Presentations

- 2019 "Agent-regret and Punishment," Criminal Law Discussion Group, Edinburgh University Law School
- 2019 "Agent-regret in our Lives," Hale Lecture, Rochester Institute of Technology
- 2019 Comments on Joe Campbell's "Compatibilist Mysterianism," Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference, University of Colorado
- 2019 "Regret and Identity," poster presentation at Rocky Mountain Ethics Conference, University of Colorado
- 2019 "Agent-regret and Punishment," Emotions & Punishment. University of Kent
- 2019 Comments on Camil Golub's "Making peace with moral imperfection," CNY Moral Psychology Workshop, Le Moyne University
- 2018 "The Narcissism of Agent-Regret," Cumberland Lodge, King's College London
- 2018 "The Narcissism of Agent-Regret," Advanced Research Seminar, King's College London
- 2018 "The Expression of Agent-Regret," Annual Conference of the European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions, Tallinn University
- 2018 "Bernard Williams on Regarding One's Own Action Purely Externally," London-Berkeley Graduate Conference, University of London
- 2018 "Outcome Responsibility and Identity," Advanced Research Seminar, King's College London
- 2018 "Reasons and Remedy: Exploring the Continuity Thesis," London Graduate Moral and Political Philosophy Workshop, King's College London
- 2017 "Reasons and Remedy: Exploring the Continuity Thesis," London Intercollegiate Graduate Conference, University of London
- 2017 "Agent-Regret and Reasons," XI Inter-University Workshop on Mind Art and Morality, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
- 2017 "Reasons and Remedy: Exploring the Continuity Thesis," Start-of-Year Graduate Conference, King's College London
- 2017 "Agent-Regret and Reasons," KCL-UNC Workshop on Reasons, UNC-Chapel Hill
- 2017 "On Susan Wolf's 'Moral Saints,'" Susan Wolf Summerschool, Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities, Essen
- 2017 "Agent-Regret and Reasons," Advanced Research Seminar, King's College London
- 2016 "Agent-Regret and Reasons," Graduate Workshop, Cornell University

- 2016 “Pleasure in the 1950s,” Staff-Student Seminar on Pleasure, King’s College London
- 2016 “On Shame,” Advanced Research Seminar, King’s College London
- 2016 Comments on “Dorothea Debus’s ‘Temporal Perspectives in Imagination: On the Nature and Value of Imagining the Future,’” Mind Metaphysics and Psychology Seminar, King’s College London
- 2015 “Dispersing Doubt: Peirce, Fallibilism, and the Aim of Inquiry,” Arts & Humanities Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Conference, King’s College London
- 2014 “Williams on Integrity,” Advanced Research Seminar, King’s College London
- 2013 “On Epistemic Justification,” First-Year Research Seminar, King’s College London

Media Appearances

- 2021 Radio Appearance – “Connections, with Evan Dawson” WXXI (NPR) re: the ethics of college athletics
- 2021 Radio Appearance – “Connections, with Evan Dawson” WXXI (NPR) re: the ethics of sports
- 2020 Radio Appearance – “Connections, with Evan Dawson” WXXI (NPR) re: Legacies
- 2020 Radio Appearance – “Connections, with Evan Dawson” WXXI (NPR) re: *The Good Place*

Teaching

Primary Instructor

- 2021 Introduction to Ethics, Summer Course (Monroe Community College)
- 2021 Professional Ethics for Criminal Justice Majors (Monroe Community College)
- 2020 Professional Ethics for Criminal Justice Majors (Monroe Community College)
- 2020 Introduction to Ethics (Monroe Community College)
- 2020 Introduction to Ethics (The College at Brockport, SUNY)

Graduate assistant (King’s College London)

- 2018 Topics in Applied Ethics and Politics (David Galloway)
- 2017 Ethics II: History of Ethical Philosophy: Hume and the British Moralists (Thomas Pink)
- 2016 Ethics II: History of Ethical Philosophy: Hume and the British Moralists (Thomas Pink)
- 2015 Skepticism (David Galloway)
- 2015 Political I: Introduction to Political Philosophy (John William Devine)
- 2015 Ethics II: Contemporary Ethics (Nadine Elzein)
- 2014 Ethics II: Contemporary Ethics (Maria Alvarez)
- 2014-15 General philosophy for intercalating medical students (David Galloway)
- 2014 Ethics I: Introduction to Ethics (Thomas Pink)

Teaching Awards and Nominations

- 2018 Teaching Excellence Award (Honorable Mention), King’s College London
- 2018 Departmental Graduate Teaching Assistant Award (Honorable Mention), King’s College London
- 2017 Departmental Graduate Teaching Assistant Award (Winner), King’s College London

Funding and Fellowships

- 2021 Society of Applied Philosophy Short-Term Postdoctoral Grant
- 2018 Aristotelian Society Student Bursary
- 2018 Department of Philosophy Peter Goldie Award, King’s College London

2015-18 Full Fees and Stipend PhD Funding, London Arts and Humanities Partnership/Arts and Humanities Research Council
2016 Norman Malcolm Fellowship funding to visit Cornell University, Cornell University/King's College London
2014-15 Department of Philosophy Bursary, King's College London

Service

Reviewer for *Inquiry*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, *The Journal of Ethics*, Routledge Books
2016 External marker for Ethics and Law module, Imperial College School of Medicine
2014-15 External Speaker program organizer for King's College London Philosophy Society

References

Prof. David Owens
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Prof. Massimo Renzo
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Prof. Tom Pink
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Prof. Antony Duff
Department of Philosophy
University of Stirling
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Dr. David Galloway (teaching reference)
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Dissertation Abstract – *Agent-Regret in Our Lives*

I analyse the emotion of agent-regret, defend our propensity to feel it, and consider its role in our lives; I do this by arguing that agent-regret concerns one's responsibility for outcomes, explain *why* we are responsible for unintended outcomes, and explore the ways that our responsibility *matters*.

My dissertation has two main parts. In the first, I offer an analysis—considerably more detailed than existing discussions—that clearly articulates the precise nature of agent-regret and the distinction between agent-regret, ordinary regret, “external” regret, and guilt. I suggest that the object of agent-regret is best understood using Honoré's notion of *outcome responsibility*: one is responsible for an outcome if it arises because one has tried to do something, even if one didn't intend to do *that thing* and wasn't at *fault* in doing it. I distinguish agent-regret from guilt by noting that guilt, specifically “the guilt of the morality system”, concerns intentional and faulty action; ordinary regret can apply to any state of affairs or action; and “external” regret involves regretting something one just so happened to be responsible for, *not* regretting one's responsibility. To feel agent-regret is to regret *one's own responsibility* for an outcome.

I then argue for a novel thesis concerning what I call “pure” agent-regret: one *might* regret being responsible for an outcome without regretting the outcome. For instance, I might regret that I killed an enemy even though I do not think this enemy being killed is regrettable. I draw parallels with revenge and explore Williams's work on integrity to make clear that one's assessment of one's responsibility for an outcome can differ radically from one's assessment of the outcome itself.

In part II, I consider the compelling idea (Wallace, Jacobson, Crisp) that we should not feel agent-regret because either we are *not* responsible for unintended outcomes or such responsibility is *unimportant*. I argue we are responsible because agency presupposes *fallible abilities*: in order to bring about any outcome, one must use these abilities; but the nature of these abilities means that, when we exercise them, we sometimes fail to bring about the intended outcome and bring about unintended outcomes instead. The best way of making sense of our relation to these failures is by admitting that although these failures are not *authored* by us—they do not manifest our values in the world—they still come about *because* of our exercises of agency. Drawing on Williams, I suggest that a “mature agent” comes to see the unintended effects of her agency as nonetheless *hers*.

This shows *that* we are responsible for unintended outcomes, but it does not show us the way in which responsibility for particular outcomes matters. Both Honoré and Williams suggested that one's responsibility for an outcome affects one's *identity*; I explore what this means and how it influences our picture of agent-regret. Outcome responsibility does not affect one's *metaphysical* identity, it affects one's *ethical identity*. I argue (against Dan-Cohen) that it does this in a *non-essentialist* way: were I not responsible for this outcome I would still be me, but my responsibility for this outcome affects how I see myself and how others interact with me. Outcome responsibility is important, and responsibility for different outcomes matters in different ways, *because* of this effect on our identities. Further, killing a child or smashing a vase each affect our identities in different ways, and this is reflected in the quality and severity of the respective cases of agent-regret.

I end by sketching several ways in which agent-regret and responsibility for unintended outcomes underpin valuable parts of our lives, like our achievements. My picture makes sense of various aspects of agent-regret, including the wish that things were otherwise, the desire to make amends, and pure cases. In the most extreme pure case, one might respond by trying to alter one's identity without attempting to make amends for the harm one caused. The killer's regret might urge him to change how people see him without urging him to make amends for, say, how his actions left his enemy's family distraught. Agent-regret is self-directed, sometimes entirely so. My dissertation is an attempt to shed light on the nature and importance of this ill-understood emotion.